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In this work, we propose a multi-agent learning framework based on the mutualinformation between the agents and their environment. Initially, each agent, basedon its neighborhood information, uses the Gaussian process regression (GPR)
to infer the environment behavior. Then, a minimization of the mutual information
between an agent and the environment is calculated by means of the rate distortion
function (RDF). In this way, a border between misunderstanding and redundancy of the
environment information is obtained, which is used as a decision rule by the agents. The
calculation of the RDF is conveniently performed through the Blahut-Arimoto algorithm,
from which, the most important elements for our model are the Lagrange multiplier s,
and the conditional distribution describing the similitude between the agent and the
environment. The parameter s plays an important role in the rationality level assumed
by the agents in the decision making process. On the other hand, due to its Boltzmann
distribution form, the conditional probability distribution establishes a Logit dynamics
pattern, used by the agents as a rule for the action selection. Finally, we include a
distributed optimization setting by means of the potential games approach, in which the
Nash equilibrium convergence is found through a distortion based potential function.
The framework, in spite of being mainly implemented in mobile sensor networks,
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In the last years, the field of multi-agent systems has gained lots of interest inthe research community to develop solutions in areas such as smart grids, con-ventional power networks, social networks, static and mobile sensor networks,
communication networks, among others, in order to provide to the elements of a system
abilities to make decisions in a decentralized form, since the conditions of isolation
in the case of microgrids, or the high data traffic to sink nodes, in the case of mobile
sensor networks, and the impossibility to have a continuous connection between all the
network nodes in the general case, make the centralized dependency more difficult every
day. The most relevant characteristics, which have begun to be intrinsic of multi-agent
systems, are the distributed control and optimization, whose implementation has a
narrow relationship with game theory. Additionally, the learning capacity on each agent
requires a network adaptation to maintain the environment understanding in spite of
the continuous interconnection change. In this sense, multiple learning techniques have
been applied in multi-agent systems, among which we can find reinforcement learning,
neuronal networks, deep learning, just to mention a few. In the game theory context,
the learning process is implicit in something known as the dynamics, which depend on
the type of game played, and consequently on the application in which they are used.
Some examples are the replicator dynamics, used in evolutionary games, and the Logit
or best response dynamics, used in strategic games. In general, the dynamics objective is
to define the set of learning rules to choose the strategies offering the best payoffs, and




Most of the approaches, especially in mobile sensor networks, that involve game
theory and distributed optimization, have been focused on agent utility definitions based
on energy consumption, sleep and awake modes, consensus based payoffs, and so on.
However, these works have not been concerned about the value of the information found
in the agent environment, an how it can improve the decision making and the system
convergence towards an equilibrium point. In this regard, we propose a multi-agent
learning framework that allows the agents to identify the environmental cues offering
the highest welfare, which can be focused to follow redundant signals or, on the contrary,
to follow the cues offering the highest difference to the current environment state. This
proposed model, begins with an environment perception at each agent, obtained through
the Gaussian process regression (GPR) approach, in which the neighbor information
is used to infer the state in the agent surroundings. After that, by means of the rate
distortion function (RDF), the agents can identify a border between redundancy and mis-
understanding about the environment information, and in this way, they can choose the
strategies to follow. Finally, the potential games approach is used to include a distributed
optimization scheme. In this way, we establish a Logit dynamics pattern to define the ac-
tion selection rule for the agents under the rationality levels established by the Lagrange
multiplier s associated to the Blahut-Arimoto algorithm, which is a computational and
straightforward way to calculate the rate distortion function. The convergence towards
an Nash equilibrium is guaranteed by a distortion based potential function, inspired in
the expected distortion associated to the mutual information minimization.
The model adaptability to different contexts is shown through an application in smart
grids in Appendix A. However, we focus the implementation to mobile sensor networks
due to the relevance of the redundancy identification in settings having a high number of
agents recovering information in spatial fields, which can cause clustering formation and
redundant covering in determined zones, and consequently, redundant transmissions to
sink nodes or data centers. Additionally, the continuous change of the network topology
and the node connections do not allow the agents to have a full environment knowledge,
which can be modeled through the proposed rationality measure.
In this sense, in the next section we describe the most relevant work related to
mobile sensor networks in which the environment information is included in the decision




The agent environment prediction through GPR (also known as Kriging filter) has been
combined with information theory in many works, mainly to find informative positions
where the agents can move. In [36], authors use a distributed Gaussian process regression
(DPGR) in order to infer the agent environment behavior using just its neighborhood
information. In this way, locations with the highest uncertainty are determined by means
of the entropy maximization to define a utility function used in the central Voronoi
tessellation (CVT) algorithm [26]. The entropy maximization is also applied in [76] to
design a sampling strategy for mobile robotic wireless sensor networks (MRWSs) focused
on the most informative zones within a spatial field that is described using a Gaussian
process. The computational cost on each node associated to the environment prediction
is addressed in [78] by means of a sparse Gaussian process. The authors in this work
compare three strategies to find the most informative locations for the agents: mutual
information based measurement selection algorithm (MI), principal feature analysis
(PFA) and informative vector machine (IVM). In [119], a Gaussian process is proposed to
describe an anisotropic field where mobile nodes find their next position according to a
centralized sampling strategy based on the Fisher Information Matrix minimization. In
[14], authors use Gaussian processes to model a scalar field in which underwater vehicles
(AUVs) define their movement through the entropy minimization between un-sampled
and sampled positions. Despite of the fact that these works address the uncertainty level
in spatial fields, the redundancy of the environment information is not considered as a
learning factor for the agent decision making.
The redundancy in the environment information has also been taken into account
in approaches focused on the energy consumption, which have been covered mainly
from the data collection and data aggregation perspectives[6]. In the case of the data
collection, in [54] a compressed sensing (CS) theory is proposed in order to reduce the
sampling points on each sensor, which leads to the reduction of energy consumption
and redundancy, since the low sampled information is reconstructed in data centers
where the energy is not limited. In [111], authors propose a model based on a random
network to reduce energy consumption in zones with redundant information, defining a
sleep-awake schedule for nodes in which the number of active terminals necessary for
keeping the network connected is minimized. In the case of the data aggregation, even
though most of the research is focused on the network lifetime and energy consumption,
data redundancy reduction is also taken into account. In [120], a distributed routing
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algorithm based on game theory is proposed to reduce the network load compressing
the correlated data between nodes. In [91], authors propose a method based on the rate
distortion function, in which, under a given distortion condition, agents estimate the
measurements of all their peers within the network and detect correlated information
to prevent its transmission. These works, in spite of involving data redundancy, do not
consider the agent environment perception as a tool for decision making. Furthermore,
most of them require a full information configuration, in which, all the network terminals
must be linked.
On the other hand, an analysis of game theory and distributed optimization for
sensor networks involving redundancy identification, lead us to the network coverage
problem, which has been addressed in literature from two sensing contexts, the static
and the mobile. In terms of coverage optimization for static networks, i.e., networks
lacking of node movement, most of the research has been focused on sleep and awake
scheduling for nodes in order to increase the lifetime of the network, and to decrease
the redundancy of monitored locations. In this regard, in [121], authors propose an
evolutionary game based algorithm named Game-Theoretical Complete Coverage (GCC)
that schedules the sleep and awake modes for nodes in a sensor network to reduce the
energy consumption, and to improve the coverage. In this work, the nodes monitoring
redundant locations are scheduled to waste energy in a distributed way, and the sensing
radius is changed depending on the population in the area. In [2], the coverage problem
in wireless sensor networks is addressed using the k-cover problem, in which k represents
the minimum number of sets, named cover sets, required to cover the whole network. A
node belongs just to one k-cover set i, and it is activated to sense in a time slot i, which
means that the network lifetime is proportional to k. The k-cover set selection for each
node follows a potential game approach, in which the payoff increases if the node is
the only one belonging to it. Through the two implemented algorithms, called SNECA
and ANECA, authors in this work demonstrate convergence to the Nash equilibrium.
In [123], authors propose a potential game in which the utility function depends on the
energy/processing cost, and the agent assignment of numerical values to the network
locations having relevant events. The Nash equilibrium is also proven in this case. From
a mobility context, network coverage has been addressed from different perspectives.
From a partial perspective, techniques such as sweep, focused, targeted, and barrier
coverages, are the most studied. On the other hand, from a full coverage point of view,
many techniques have been proposed, being the most relevant the fuzzy and evolutionary
computing, virtual force, and geometry based coverage[71]. In [57], through a game
4
1.2. MAIN CONTRIBUTION
theoretic approach, authors show the improvement in target detection when the network
nodes have mobility abilities. Additionally, they compare the coverage area between static
and mobile sensor networks, showing the advantages of mobility. In [110], the Voronoi
diagrams are the basis to implement three algorithms to calculate the locations where
sensors have to move in order to optimize the network coverage. The first two, named
VOR and Minimax, are designed to make the nodes move towards uncovered holes,
avoiding the new holes generation in the Minimax case. In the third one, named VEC,
the sensors are simulated as electronic particles, and in this way, they move away from
densely covered areas. In [21], a sweep coverage case is addressed, in which each point of
interest (POI) within the monitored region receives a weight according to their relevance
level. In this way, the proposed algorithm allows the mobile sensors to visit the most
relevant places more frequently. In [112], a particle Swarm Optimization (PSO) approach
based on social behavior of flocking birds is formulated to maximize the network coverage
and minimize the energy consumption. In this work, a re-sampling process is introduced
to improve the performance of PSO, and the exploration of regions having the highest
fitness is controlled through an inertia parameter. In [19], authors define a mission space
Ω ∈R2, and a density function R(x), with x ∈Ω, to represent the probability that an event
s at x exceeds a specific threshold. The event detection follows the model proposed in
[25], in which the event signal decays as a polynomial of the distance. The joint detection
probability P(x,a), i.e., the probability that the event is detected by the set of agents
located at a, is used to maximize the expected event detection frequency. This work, is
used in [60] to define the potential function φ(a)=∑s R(x)P(x,a), which is maximized to
optimize the coverage in a spatial field. The maximization is performed by each agent
using the algorithm RSAP (Restricted Spatial Adaptive Play) and a wonderful life utility
function (WLU [106]). The trade-off between energy consumption and coverage is also
studied in [84]. This time, authors use a potential game whose utility function depends
on the energy expenditure both for sensing and moving. They show that the convergence
time to a Nash Equilibrium decreases if the mutual information between observed and
unobserved regions is included within the utility function.
1.2 Main Contribution
Although the aforementioned approaches exhibit a successful performance in static and
mobile settings, they are not concerned about the redundancy of information between the
agent and the environment, and how it can improve the decision making process. Addi-
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tionally, the research works involving game theory do not put an especial interest to the
definition of rationality levels at which an agent can get the highest or the lowest under-
standing about the environment. In this regard, the main contribution of our approach
is the ability of the agents to detect environment cues having high or low redundancy,
whose identification is performed through the mutual information minimization provided
by the rate distortion function. In this way, agents can decide to follow redundant signals
in event tracking tasks, or to avoid them if a field exploration is desired. On the other
hand, the rationality level given by the parameter s of the Blahut-Arimoto algorithm,
allows the system to define a high or a low environment understanding. At the highest
rationality level, the agents find environment positions having more utility in terms
of the distortion reduction. On the contrary, at the lowest rationality level, the agents
perform in a highly distorted setting, but developing exploratory skills that contribute to
the system convergence towards the Nash equilibrium.
As we will show in Chapter 4, the model is implemented in mobile sensor networks,
outperforming the work in [60] in terms of the number of agents covering a variable
spatial field, and in the number of time steps in an invariant field with obstacles.
Additionally, in Appendix A, we demonstrate its applicability in other multi-agent
contexts, where the reactive power sharing problem of a microgrid is addressed. Below
we show a list of the published and submitted work related to our approach.
1.3 List of Publications
1.3.1 International Journals
1. D.A. Martínez, E. Mojica-Nava, K. Watson, and T. Usländer, “Multi-Agent Self-
Redundancy Identification and Tuned Greedy-Exploration”. Submitted to the IEEE
Transactions on Cybernetics.
2. D.A. Martínez, E. Mojica-Nava, “Distortion Based Potential Game for Distributed
Coverage Control”. Submitted to the IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man and
Cybernetics:Systems.
1.3.2 International Conferences
1. D. A. Martínez, E. Mojica-Nava, K. Watson, and T. Usländer, “Multi-agent Learning
Framework for Environment Redundancy Identification for Mobile Sensors in
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an IoT Context”, 3rd International Conference on Smart Data and Smart Cities,
Delft-The Netherlands, vol. XLII-4/W11. ISPRS - International Archives of the
Photogrammetry, Remote Sensing and Spatial Information Sciences, 2018, pp.
33–41.
2. D. A. Martínez and E. Mojica-Nava, “Information Theory and Self Organization in
Sensor Networks”, 9th International Workshop on Optimization in Logistics and
Industrial Applications 2018 - 1st German-French Joint Research Workshop on
Industrie 4.0 and Industrie Du Futur, Karlsruhe-Germany, May 2018.
3. D. A. Martínez, R. Rincón, E. Mojica-Nava, and A. Pavas, “Reactive power sharing
in microgrids: An information-theoretical approach”, 2017 IEEE 3rd Colombian
Conference on Automatic Control (CCAC), IEEE, Cartagena-Colombia, Oct 2017,
pp. 1–6.
4. D. A. Martínez and E. Mojica-Nava, “Correlation as a measure for fitness in multi-
agent learning systems”, 2016 IEEE Latin American Conference on Computational
Intelligence (LA-CCI), IEEE, Cartagena-Colombia, Nov 2016, pp. 1–6.
5. D. A. Martínez and E. Mojica-Nava, “Graph transfer function representation to
measure network robustness”, Impact and Advances of Automatic Control in Lati-
namerica, Medellin-Colombia, Oct 2016, pp. 172–176.
6. D. A. Martínez and E. Mojica-Nava, “Entropy measures in evolving networks”, Com-
plex Networks: from theory to interdisciplinary applications, Marseilles-France,July
2016.
7. D. A. Martínez, C. Cusgüen, and E. Mojica-Nava, “Correlation network with stub-
born agents in an opinion dynamic model”, 2016 Conference on Complex Systems,
Amsterdam-The Netherlands, September-2016.
8. D. A. Martínez, R. Rincón, E. Mojica-Nava, “Reactive Power Sharing in Isolated
Micogrid Using a Controller Based on Information Theory”, Latin American Con-
ference on Complex Networks, Puebla-Mexico, September 2017.
9. D. A. Martínez, E. Mojica-Nava, “Agent-Environment Mutual Information in a Po-





The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we describe the main concepts
associated to the definition of the proposed learning model. First, we describe the rate
distortion function (RDF) and the associated Blahut-Arimoto algorithm, used to find
it in a less complex way. Second, we describe the Gaussian process regression (GPR)
approach, and how it will be used to infer the agent information. Finally, we show the
main concepts about game theory, with especial emphasis in potential games, the Logit
and the replicator dynamics, which are used in the model implementation for mobile
sensor networks and smart grids, respectively.
In Chapter 3, by means of the parameter s of the Blahut-Arimoto algorithm, we
define the highest and the lowest rationality values for the agent learning process, which
determine the maximum and minimum environment understanding, according to the
borders established by the rate distortion function.
In Chapter 4, we include the potential game approach in the model, defining a
distortion based potential function that allows the system to find a Nash equilibrium.
Finally, we show the model performance in a mobile sensor network in order to address
the network coverage problem. Additionally, the applicability of the model in other











In this chapter, we describe the main concepts used to formulate the proposed multi-agent learning framework. Firstly, we describe the fundamental notions relatedto information theory, putting especial interest in the rate distortion function and
the Blahut-Arimoto algorithm. Secondly, we expose the most relevant definitions about
the Gaussian process regression approach, which is used in our model to infer the agent
environment behavior. Finally, we describe the game theory definitions associated to our
framework formulation, emphasizing in potential games and the Logit dynamics model,
which is used as a rule for agents to choose their strategies towards a desired system
configuration, known as the Nash equilibrium.
2.1 Entropy and Mutual Information
The entropy is a measure of the uncertainty of a random variable X , which can take any
value x belonging to the alphabet X . This is defined by
H(X )=− ∑
x∈X
p(x) log p(x), (2.1)
where p(x) is the probability of X = x, and the logarithm base is 2, hence, the entropy
is given in bits1 [27] [93]. The above quantity is always positive, since 0≤ p(x)≤ 1 and
log p(x)≤ 0.
1Although we have chosen 2 as the logarithm base, it could take any base value. So, for instance, a
logarithm base e results in an entropy measured in nats.
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Example 2.1.1. Consider a random variable X , with alphabet X = [a,b, c,d, e]. Let us
suppose that there is no information about the frequency of each symbol in a communi-
cation process, therefore, we assume the uniform probability distribution p(x)= 15 . Then,











= 2.3219 bits. (2.2)
Now, suppose that the receptor of a transmitted message receives the string {aaabcccdee}.
In this case, the probability of each x ∈X is p(a) = 0.4, p(b) = 0.1, p(c) = 0.3, p(d) = 0.1,
and p(e)= 0.1. In consequence, the entropy value is
H(X )=− ∑
x∈X
p(x) log p(x)=−0.4log0.4−3(0.1log0.1)−0.3log0.3= 2.0464 bits, (2.3)
which reflects the uncertainty reduction when we have previous information about the
symbol probabilities in a message.
In general terms, the entropy is maximum when the probability distribution is
uniform, and decreases as previous information is provided. This can be observed in
Figure 2.1, which shows the entropy curve for a random variable X having two possible
values a,b ∈X , each one with probabilities q and 1− q, respectively. Observe how the
entropy value is the highest when q = 12 , i.e., the distribution is uniform, and it is zero
when q = 0 or q = 1, since at these points there is no uncertainty about the value of X .
The above description lead us to define an expression for the conditional entropy
between two random variables.
Definition 2.1. The conditional entropy of two random variables X and Y is defined by
H(Y |X )=− ∑
x∈X ,y∈Y
p(x, y) log p(y|x). (2.4)
The expression in (2.4) allows us to formulate the next theorem.
Theorem 2.1. The joint entropy of two random variables X and Y is defined as
H(X ,Y )=− ∑
x∈X ,y∈Y
p(x, y) log p(x, y)= H(X )+H(Y |X ). (2.5)
Proof.
H(X ,Y )=− ∑
x∈X ,y∈Y














p(x, y) log p(y|x), (2.8)
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p(x)


















Figure 2.1: Entropy curve for a random variable X with two possible values a,b ∈ X
having probabilities p(a)= q, and p(b)= 1− q.
since
∑
y∈Y p(x, y)= p(x),
H(X ,Y )=− ∑
x∈X




p(x, y) log p(y|x), (2.9)
and from (2.4), we have
H(X ,Y )= H(X )+H(Y |X ). (2.10)

The above theorem tell us that the joint entropy is equal to the entropy of X plus
the entropy of Y reduced because of the previous knowledge of X . Now, having into
account the above definitions, let us define the mutual information between two random
variables, which is one of the most relevant concepts of our research work.
Definition 2.2. The mutual information between two random variables X and Y is
defined by






and is given in bits.
The expression in (2.11) can also be described through the Kullback-Leibler diver-
gence, which is defined as a measure of the distance between the probability distributions
11
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Equation (2.12) is interpreted as the loss of information when a random variable X ,
originally described with a probability distribution p(x), is described using a different
distribution q(x). Then, for the mutual information case, we have
I(X ;Y )= KL(p(x, y)||p(x)p(y)). (2.13)
In an entropy context, the mutual information represents the uncertainty reduction of
Y when some cue about X is previously known. This is established through the next
theorem.
Theorem 2.2 (Entropy and mutual information). For two random variables X and Y ,
we have that
I(X ;Y )= H(Y )−H(Y |X ). (2.14)
Proof. From (2.11) we have














p(x, y) log p(y)+ ∑
x∈X ,y∈Y




x∈X p(x, y)= p(y), then






p(x, y) log p(y|x)
)
, (2.19)
and using (2.4), we obtain
I(X ;Y )= H(Y )−H(Y |X ). (2.20)

Once the concept of mutual information has been defined, we focus our interest in
the minimum mutual information necessary to represent X by means of Y when they
are separated by a distance commonly know as the distortion measure. This is described
in the next section.
12
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2.2 The Rate Distortion Function
The rate distortion function represents the minimum mutual information between two
random variables involved in a setting having distortion. In order to describe this
concept, let us assume a message interchange between a sender and a receiver through
a communication channel, as depicted in Figure 2.2. The random variable X represents
the sent message, while the random variable Y the received one. The noise source,
intrinsic to the communication channel, generates the distortion that avoids to have X
in the reception point [93]. The difference between the sent and the received messages is
described through a distortion measure, which in our case is the squared error distortion
measure defined by






Figure 2.2: Message interchange between a sender and a receiver.
The expression in (2.21) determines an expected distortion value, named D, associated
to a rate in bits, named R, necessary to have legibility of the sent message in the reception

















2Henceforth, for simplicity, we are going to use x and y to refer the x ∈X and y ∈Y , respectively.
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J [p(y|x), p(y)] , (2.25)
where
∑
xλx =λ. Equation (2.25) is a double minimization problem tackled in two steps









which are the basis for the Blahut-Arimoto algorithm formulation [15], described here
below.
2.2.1 The Blahut-Arimoto Algorithm
The Blahut-Arimoto algorithm calculates iteratively the p∗(y|x) and p∗(y) of (2.25),
until a convergence condition is found, as depicted in Figure 2.3. This receives as
input parameters an initial uniform distribution po(y) = 1|Y | , the Lagrange multiplier
s ∈ R−, and the previously known source distribution p(x). The resulting outputs are
the conditional distribution p(y|x), i.e., the probability of a y ∈Y for a given x ∈X , the
expected distortion D, and its associated rate R, whose values are determined by the
value of s, which we describe in detail hereafter.
3We use the Lagrange multiplier representation s as an approximation to the symbol used in the
literature related to the Blahut-Arimoto algorithm.
14
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Input: s,



































Figure 2.3: The Blahut-Arimoto algorithm.
2.2.1.1 The Parameter s
For simplicity, let us explain the relevance of the parameter s by means of the following
example. Consider a random variable X with X = {x ∈R :−10≤ x ≤ 10}, and a Gaussian
source distribution p(x)=N (µ= 0, σ2 = 3). For −20≤ s≤−2, the rate distortion function
is the one shown in Figure 2.4. The allowed region is composed of the set of points {R,D}
that guarantee message legibility in a reception point, in spite of receiving a symbol y ∈Y
when the sent symbol in the transmission point was x ∈X . On the other hand, the set of
points {R,D} on the R(D) curve determine the boundary at which the mutual information
is minimum but enough to have legibility between the emitted and the received message,
























Figure 2.4: R(D) curve for −20≤ s≤−2 and p(x)=N (µ= 0, σ2 = 3)
The relationship between the parameter s and the R(D) curve is visible if we recall
(2.25), which can be rewritten in the linear form
R(D)= sD+b, (2.28)
in other words, s determines a negative slope in a {D,R} point of the curve, being the
lowest value associated to the highest rate and the lowest distortion, as shown in Figure
2.5, in which we can observe a lower distortion for a slope s = −2
σ2
than for a slope s = −1
σ2
.
The parameter s also affects the certainty of the conditional distribution p(y|x).
Figure 2.6 shows how the variance of p(y|x =−5.15) changes depending on the value of s.
Note how the variance decreases when s is more negative, i.e., for a low distortion. In
contrast, the variance increases for values of s close to zero, i.e., when the distortion is
higher.
At this point, it is noticeable that the selection of s can define the level of distortion
that we want to have for a specific application. In our approach, this parameter is
important to establish an agent rationality level for the learning process of a multi-agent
system. This will be described in detail in Chapter 3.
2.2.1.2 Calculation of the Source Probability p(x)
The source distribution p(x) used as an input in the Blahut-Arimoto algorithm is not
always known, which means that it must be obtained through a statistical procedure.
16
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Distortion


























Figure 2.5: Relationship between the parameter s and the R(D) curve.
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Figure 2.6: Relationship between the parameter s and p(y|x).
In this sense, one of the most popular approaches to calculate unbiased probability
distributions from previous knowledge exposed in the form of distribution moments, is
















where Fk is the expected value of a function gk(x). Using the Lagrange multipliers, the
















































The above approach is highly useful to find an unbiased probability distribution
p(x) when the previous knowledge is present in form of distribution moments, such as
the expected value. However, when this previous information is not present, the p(x)
distribution having maximum entropy can be found in the following equivalent Gaussian







Then, assuming a zero mean, our problem is reduced to the calculation of the covariance
Σ. Fortunately, we can take advantage of the popular kernel RBF (Radial Basis Function),





2.3. NON PARAMETRIC LEARNING
where c(xn, xm) is the covariance between a pair of points xn and xm belonging to the
observed data, named training data, while the parameters α and γ define the smoothness
of the resultant distribution. This lead us to describe the Gaussian process regression
approach, used in this work as a method to infer the source distribution describing the
agent environment.
2.3 Non Parametric Learning
One of the most simple cases of a learning process is the fitting of a function f (x) based
on a set of known values, named the training data, to predict unknown values, named the
test data, in a set of positions in x. In this regard, the use of linear parametric regressions
with the form
yn = f (xn;w0,w1)= w0 +w1x, (2.37)
has been widely used, in which, the parameters wn are calculated from an error min-
imization. In this sense, for a two parameters regression, and using the squared loss







(yn − f (xn;w0,w1))2, (2.38)
where the set y = [y1, ..., yN] represents the training values corresponding to the x =
[x1, ..., xN] training points. This kind of model, in spite of being extended to non linear
cases by means of the addition of parameters, becomes unmanageable as the parameter
number increases. In this regard, the Gaussian Processes Regression (GPR), offers a non
parametric alternative to address this kind of problems.
2.3.1 Gaussian Process Regression
The GPR consists of the definition of a posterior function f ∗, from a prior function f
satisfying a previously set of observed data, named the training data. In order to explain
this, let us assume that we have a set of N training points, given by the set x= [x1, ..., xN ],
and their corresponding training values, given by f = [ f1, ..., fN]. In the same way, we
have a set of M testing points, given by the set x∗ = [x∗1 , ..., x∗M], at which we want to
predict the corresponding testing values, given by the set f∗ = [ f ∗1 , ..., f ∗M].
4The squared loss function measures how close is a particular prediction model to the training data.
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Since the GPR assumes that the function values at all the points (training and








which, also follows a Gaussian density [89] [86]. Assuming a zero mean, the prior









where C is the covariance matrix for the training points, C∗ is the cross-covariance
between the training and test points, while C∗∗ is the covariance matrix for the testing
points, which are obtained by applying the kernel function defined in (2.36). On the other
hand, since in a multivariate Gaussian context a subset of variables conditioned on the
others is also Gaussian distributed, the expression
p(f∗|f)=N (µ,Σ), (2.41)
also represents a Gaussian distribution, where
µ= C∗C−1f, (2.42)
and
Σ= C∗∗−CT∗ C−1C∗. (2.43)
Finally, if we want to find the set of testing values f∗, we use the Cholesky decomposition
to find a J such that Σ= JJT , and thus, f∗ ≈µ+ JN (0, I). Let us to illustrate the above
concepts with a simple example.
Example 2.3.1. Consider the Figure 2.7, which shows the set of training points
x= [−8,−6,−4,−2,0,2,4,6,8],
and their corresponding training values
f= [0.54,1.9,−2,0.54,0.43,−1.25,−0.6,0.28,3.6],
represented as red circles. Suppose that we want to predict the testing values at the set
















Figure 2.7: The sets of training points, training values, and the test points.
By means of a MATLAB script, we calculate the set of mean values
µ= [−0.17,0.6,0.84,1.12,0.52],
and the set of covariances
Σ= [0.35,0.34,0.34,0.34,0.34].
These results are shown in Figure 2.8. In Figure 2.8a, we observe the mean values,
represented as black dots, and their corresponding standard deviation. In Figure 2.8b
we show the resulting function f ∗, depicted as a black curve.
2.4 Game Theory
Game theory has become a powerful tool for multi agent learning systems, since its
inclusion in distributed optimization approaches, has permitted the maximization or
minimization of objective functions in order to reach a Nash equilibrium, at which each
agent has the best utility, while the others remain in their current state. In this section,
we describe the most relevant concepts related to game theory, emphasizing in potential
















(a) The testing values and their corresponding stan-
dard deviations.
x












(b) The resultant predicted function.
Figure 2.8: The GPR prediction result.
2.4.1 Strategic Games
The concept of strategic games was introduced by Neumann and Morgenstern in their
seminal work “Theory of Games and Economic Behavior” [108], whose initial economic
focus, has been derived to others sciences such as mathematics, biology, sociology, physics,
and engineering, among others. In this theory, the game players, henceforth referred to
as agents, interact in a setting at which the individual welfare does not only depend on
the individual selected strategy, but also on the strategies assumed by the others.
In a formal way, a strategic game defined by G, is composed of a set of N selfish
agents, in which an agent i, i ∈ {1, ..., N}, has a finite set of strategies or actions Si. In
this way, the set of all the system strategy configurations, or strategy profiles, is given
by S =∏N1 Si = S1×, ...,×SN . This means that in a determined time step, each agent can
choose a strategy si ∈ Si, which results in a system strategy profile s= (s1, ..., sN),s ∈ S,
at which the utility of the agent i is Ui(s) : S1×, ...,×SN →R. Adopting the standard game
theoretic notation, we use s−i to refer the set of actions assumed by the agents different
to the agent i. With the above concepts in mind, let us define the Nash equilibrium.
Definition 2.3 (The Nash equilibrium). An action profile s∗ = (s∗i , s∗−i) is a Nash equilib-
rium, if ∀i ∈ N and ∀si ∈ Si
Ui(s∗)≥Ui(si, s∗−i). (2.44)




As we have mentioned, the agent strategy selection depends on its utility, and the
actions taken by the others. This process, commonly known as the dynamics, is an
evolving mechanism that defines the action selection of the agents, through which the
multi-agent system eventually finds the Nash equilibrium. In this sense, many types
of dynamics have been proposed, being the most popular the Logit dynamics, replicator
dynamics, Smith dynamics, among others [90]. In this work, we are especially concerned
with the Logit dynamics, which is a noisy version of the best response dynamics. However,
the replicator dynamics is also considered in one of the applications of the proposed
learning model, as we will see in Appendix A.
2.4.2 The Logit Dynamics
In a simple form, in a best response dynamics setting, the agents take turns to assume
the most profitable action against the selected actions by the other agents. According to
[17], for a given set of best responses denoted as M(si, s−i), where (si, s−i) is the current




|M(si ,s−i)| if sk ∈M(si, s−i)
0 otherwise.
(2.45)
This kind of dynamics assume agent rationality, i.e., agents have complete knowledge
about the strategies followed by the others, which is not always possible in a realistic
context. In this regard, the Logit dynamics tackles the knowledge limitation through a
rationality measure β, used to define the rules followed by an agent in order to choose its





where sk ∈ Si.
The above expression has the form of a Boltzmann distribution, in which the rational-
ity measure β is similar to the inverse temperature. According to [8], the Logit dynamics
is a noisy best-response dynamics, where the noise level is determined by β. In this sense,
for β = 0, the decisions are made under the highest noise condition, and the strategy
selection follows a uniform distribution, i.e., each strategy has the same probability to
be chosen. On the other hand, when β→∞, the agent tends to choose the strategy that
corresponds to its best response. Independently of the initial strategy profile, the Logit
dynamics converges to a stationary distribution after a number of steps given by the
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rationality level. This means that, after a sufficiently large time, the probability of find
the system in a specific strategy profile remains unchanged, and there is no a strategy
that improves an agent benefit when the others remain static, which constitutes a Nash
equilibrium.
2.4.3 Replicator Dynamics
Before to explain the concept of replicator dynamics, let us explain some relevant concepts
related to evolutionary games.
2.4.3.1 Evolutionary Game Theory
In evolutionary games the utility of each individual or player is interpreted as a fitness
value that depends on the frequency or proportion of a phenotype in a population [77]. In
contrast with strategic games, in evolutionary games the players do not make decisions
based on rationality, but in the acquired information through the interaction. In this
sense, the individuals find out the payoff of their peers, and emulate the strategies
followed by the ones having the highest rewards. This process is similar to the natural
selection, in which the strategies having good rewards reproduce faster, whereas those
strategies having the poorest incentives tend to disappear. This is illustrated in Figure
2.9. First, in Figure 2.9a we show a player in red to represent the population proportion
following the strategy with the highest payoff. Second, in Figure 2.9b we show how the
players that initially follow the blue strategy having lower payoff, begin to change to
the red one after the interaction with the first player. The increment of the number of
players following the red strategy causes its payoff decrease. Conversely, the strategy in
blue begins to be worthy.
In a formal way, for a pair of strategies A and B, the respective frequencies are
denoted by xA and xB. Then, the population composition is given by x = (xA, xB), and












where f = xA fA(x)+ xB fB(x) is the average fitness, and xA + xB = 1. This last condition,
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(a) The fitness of the strategy A (in red)
is higher.
(b) The fitness of the strategy B (in
blue) begins to increase.
Figure 2.9: Population dependency of fitness.
allows us to make x = xA and xB = 1− x, therefore we have that
f = xfA(x)+ (1− x) fB(x) (2.49)
= xfA(x)+ fB − xfB. (2.50)
Replacing (2.50) in (2.47), we obtain
ẋ = x(1− x)[ fA(x)− fB(x)], (2.51)
which is a differential equation with equilibrium at x = 0, x = 1, and all the values of x
satisfying fA(x)= fB(x).
2.4.3.2 The Replicator Dynamics Equation
Consider a set of n strategies and a n×n matrix, denoted as the payoff matrix, whose
component ai j represents the payoff associated to the interaction between the strategies




x jai j. (2.52)




xi f i. (2.53)








Example 2.4.1 (The prisoners dilemma). In this popular example, two crooks have been
captured by the police, who has offered two options. The first one is to confess, and the
second one is to keep quiet. If one of the crooks confess that both committed the crime,
he will be set free and the other will spend 5 years in jail. If both confess, they will get a
sentence of 3 years. If neither confess, they have to spend 1 year in jail. Let us denote
by A the strategy of keep quiet, and by B the strategy of confess. The corresponding
payoff matrix is shown in Table 2.1. The pairs (x, y) on each cell, represent the payoff of
player X and Y, respectively, for a given combination of strategies A and B. Observing the
payoff values, we can deduce that when both players choose A, just the player X improves
its payoff for changing to strategy B. On the other hand, if both payers have chosen B,
neither player will improve its utility for changing to A. Therefore, the strategy B is
a Nash equilibrium [113] [77]. In terms of evolutionary games, this Nash equilibrium
implies an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS), i.e, a strategy that will offer the best






Table 2.1: Payoff matrix for the prisoner dilemma game.
If we apply the replicator dynamics equation of (2.54), we can observe the evolution
of both strategies. This is shown in Figure 2.10. Observe how the frequency of strategy B
(xB) overcomes the frequency of A (xA), no matter the initial conditions.
2.4.4 Potential Games
A strategic game is a potential game if exists a potential function φ(s) : S → R,s ∈ S
that reflects the individual utility change when each agent unilaterally assume a new
strategy, no matter which one caused it. In this way, the local optima of φ(s) can be used
to find the set of pure Nash equilibrium of the whole system. We can find many types of
potential games in literature [73] [109]. Hereafter, let us describe some of them.
Definition 2.4 (Ordinal potential game). An ordinal potential game is defined by
Ui(sk, s−i)−Ui(sl , s−i)> 0⇐⇒φ(sk, s−i)−φ(sl , s−i)> 0, (2.55)






























Figure 2.10: The evolution of strategies A and B.
Definition 2.5 (Exact potential game). An exact potential game is defined by
Ui(sk, s−i)−Ui(sl , s−i)=φ(sk, s−i)−φ(sl , s−i), (2.56)
where sk, sl ∈ Si.
Definition 2.6 (Weighted potential game). A weighted potential game is defined by
Ui(sk, s−i)−Ui(sl , s−i)=
φ(sk, s−i)−φ(sl , s−i)
wi
, (2.57)
where sk, sl ∈ Si, and wi ∈R+.
Example 2.4.2. Considering the prisoners dilemma of example 2.4.1, we can define the
potential function shown in Table 2.2. This is an exact potential function since for player
X we have
UX (A, A)−UX (B, A)= 5−3= 2, (2.58)
which is equal to
φ(A, A)−φ(B, A)= 2−0= 2. (2.59)
The above proof can be demonstrated for any strategy combination and player.
In this regard, the agents constituting a multi-agent system have as common goal













Table 2.2: Potential function for the prisoner dilemma game.
Additionally to the exposed variety and relative simplicity, one of the main advantages
of potential games is the existence of at least one action profile that guarantees a Nash
equilibrium, which is reached in our case, through the Logit dynamics. However, in
most of the cases, the potential function definition could become a challenging affair.
The most straightforward method is to make Ui(s) =φ(s), s ∈ S, which is applicable in
systems having small number of agents, since it requires that each agent has a complete
information about the payoffs obtained by the others, due to its utility depends directly
on the potential function. In this sense, approaches such as wonderful life utility and
the Shapley value, have been proposed in [116] and [7] respectively, which fit well in
incomplete information contexts [101]. In our work, we define a distortion based potential
function, that exploits the rate distortion function characteristics, defined in Section 2.22.











The multi-agent learning model proposed in this work combines the predictive ca-pabilities of GPR, the minimization of the mutual information, obtained throughthe rate distortion function, and the qualities of potential games in terms of dis-
tributed optimization. In this chapter, we firstly establish a multi-agent setting, in which
each agent infers its environment by means of the GPR approach, using as training data
the information provided by the agents belonging to its neighborhood. Once this environ-
ment is modeled through a probability distribution, it is used as the source distribution
of the Blahut-Arimoto algorithm, which allows us to obtain the rate and distortion values
associated to the parameter s, which in our case, acts as a rationality measure having a
maximum and a minimum determined by the rate distortion function. In this regard, the
maximum rationality value establishes the point from which there is no an improvement
for the agent in terms of environment understanding, while the minimum rationality
value defines the border at which the distortion about the environment is maximum
but enough to understand it. Both rationality levels determine the agent behavior, since
they can define the equilibrium deviation, and the convergence time, as we will show in
Chapter 4, where the potential game approach is included in our model.
3.1 The Multi-Agent Environment
In order to describe the multi-agent environment, let us consider the configuration
shown in Figure 3.1, which contains a set of N mobile sensing agents indexed by i ∈
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{1, ..., N}, deployed in a spatial fieldΩ ∈R2, having the positions S = {s1, ..., sN },S ∈Ω, and
sensing measurements V = {v1, ...,vN }1. The training set for an agent i combines its own
position si and measurement vi, with the positions s j ′s and measurements v j ′s of its
neighborhood, defined by Ni = { j ∈ N : ||si − s j|| ≤ rc}, where rc is the connection radius.
The environment of the agent i is composed of the set of testing points Zi = {z1, ..., zM},
and the corresponding set of testing values Wi = {w1, ...,wM}, which are inferred using
GPR. As we have mentioned in Section 2.3.1, the GPR prediction process give us a pair
(µm,Σm) for each point m = {1, ..., M} of the testing set, in other words, the environment
for an agent i, can be described by a set of Gaussian distributions N (µ,Σ). This lead us
to the next definition.









where µm and Σm are the predicted mean and variance in the testing point m ∈ {1, ..., M},
respectively.
The set of locations Zi constituting the environment, becomes a set of possible actions
to take for the agent, and defines its movement within the spatial field.
Definition 3.2 (The agent action set). The set of locations Zi = {z1, ..., zM} determines
the set of possible actions to be taken for an agent i, named the agent action set.
In this sense, each agent chooses the action offering the best utility at each time step,
and in this way, it moves within the spatial field towards an equilibrium point, as we
will describe in Chapter 4.
The set of distributions given in (3.1) determines the source distribution p(x) neces-
sary to calculate the rate distortion function through the Blahut-Arimoto algorithm.
Remark 3.1 (Blahut-Arimoto source distribution). The source distribution p(x), nec-
essary to calculate the rate distortion function R(D), and consequently, the minimum
1Although the model is defined in R2, it can be extended to ∈R3
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Figure 3.1: Multi-agent model setting.
















With this in mind, we can proceed to apply the Blahut-Arimoto algorithm, which
provides the pair rate and distortion (R,D), for a given value of the parameter s, which,
as we have mentioned, is the factor that set the rationality level of or approach. This is
described below.
3.1.1 The Lowest Rationality
In Section 2.2.1.1, we have shown the relationship between the parameter s of the
Blahut-Arimoto algorithm, with the rate distortion function, and how it determines the
points (R,D) on it. Now, let us find the value of s at which an agent has the maximum
allowed distortion about its environment, but enough information to comprehend it.
At this point, we have the lowest rationality, which is described by means of the next
theorem.
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Theorem 3.1 (The lowest rationality). Consider the environment for the agent i, de-
scribed by the vector of Gaussian distributions p(x) given by (3.2), and the corresponding
set of values for the parameter s expressed as
s=
[
s1, . . . ,sM
]T
. (3.3)




Proof. According to [27], the rate distortion function for a Gaussian source N (µ,σ2) and






D , 0≤ D ≤σ2
0, D >σ2.
(3.5)
For the case of our work, this Gaussian source is given by p(x). Then, the rate distortion








Recalling that the slope in a point (D,R) of the function R(D) is given by the parameter





Then, for the upper distortion limit Dm =Σm, we have
sm ≤− 12Σm
. (3.8)





Remark 3.2 (Exploratory behavior). For the lowest rationality defined in (3.4), the agents
behave in a exploratory form, since they tend to avoid the environment cues determined
by their neighbors.
The above result gains relevance in a setting where the field exploration is required,
since the agent movement through uncorrelated regions, could promote the discovering
of wealthy locations. Hereafter, we describe the set of steps necessary to establish the
maximum rationality value.
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3.1.2 The Highest Rationality
In the previous section, we have found the value of the parameter s at which an agent
has the minimum information about the environment, but enough to understand it,
which is determined by the limits imposed by the rate distortion function. Now, we are
going to find the value of s at which an agent has the maximum information about
its environment, in other words, the highest rationality. If we think in the distortion
reduction as a measure of utility, the highest rationality point defines a limit at which
an agent does not improve its benefit for decreasing the distortion or increasing the rate,
as we will shown in Chapter 4. In other words, there is a distortion level at which the
agent understands the environment in the same way as if it were zero. In this approach,
we are going to employ the conditional distribution p(y|x), resulting from the mutual
information minimization, as a measure of the understanding about the environment for
each agent. This lead us to the next definition.
Definition 3.3 (Agent environment understanding). Let p(y) be the distribution describ-
ing the agent behavior, and let p(x), defined in (3.2), be the distribution describing the
agent environment. Then, the agent understanding about the environment is given by









where p(y|xm)= Axy p(y)∑y Axy p(y) , and Axy = esL(y,xm), as stated in the Blahut-Arimoto algorithm
described in Section 2.2.1.
In this sense, there is a value for the parameter s at which the agent information
has the highest similitude to the environment, and it occurs when the distributions p(x)
and p(y|x) have the lowest distance or, in other words, the minimum Kullback-Leibler
divergence. To find it, let us begin describing, through Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2, respectively,
the matrix Axy, and the distribution p(y) in terms of the distortion, which, for the set of
points constituting the agent action set, is given by the vector
D=
[
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Lemma 3.1. Let 0 ≤ Dm ≤ Σm, with m ∈ {1, ..., M}. Then, for a given x = xm and y ∈ Y ,




Proof. From the Blahut-Arimoto algorithm we have Axy = esm(y−xm)2 , and from Theorem






Lemma 3.2. Let 0 ≤ Dm ≤ Σm, with m ∈ {1, ..., M}. Then, for a given x = xm and y ∈ Y ,




Proof. According to [27], the mutual information of two correlated Gaussian random


















On the other hand, from the Blahut-Arimoto algorithm we have4
p(y|x)= Axy p(y). (3.18)






2The alphabet Y represents a set of possible measurement values taken by the agent.
3To facilitate the calculation we ignore the normalization term 1∑
y Axy
.
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Now, using (3.17), we have











So far, we have defined p(y) and Axy as functions of the distortion. Now, using (3.18),
Lemma 3.1 and 3.2, the conditional distribution p(y|x) can also be given in terms of the
distortion. This is established in the following Lemma.
Lemma 3.3. Let 0 ≤ Dm ≤ Σm, with m ∈ {1, ..., M}. Then, for a given x = xm and y ∈ Y ,






Proof. According to the Blahut-Arimoto algorithm, p(y|x)= Axy p(y). Then, using Lemma
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Now, using (3.27), we can obtain a relationship between the distribution p(x) describ-
ing the environment, and the distribution p(y|x), which, as we have defined, describes
the agent understanding about the environment. This is formulated by means of the
next theorem.
Theorem 3.2 (The highest rationality). Let KL [p(x)||p(y|x)] be the distance between
the distribution describing the environment and the distribution describing the agent
understanding about the environment. Then, the agent rationality is the highest when




Proof. The similitude between the conditional distribution p(y|x) and the distribution
p(x), which describes the environment, can be measured through the Kullback-Leibler




































subject to Dm ≤Σm
−Dm ≤ 0.
(3.32)







−λ1Σm −λ2 = 0, (3.33)
5We use µym =µm, i.e., the Blahut-Arimoto algorithm finds the conditional distribution p(y|x =µm)
for each point m ∈ {1, ..., M} of the agent environment.
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where λ1 ≥ 0,λ2 ≥ 0,λ1(Dm −Σm)= 0,Dmλ2 = 0.
From (3.33), it is evident that Σm 6= Dm and Dm 6= 0, then λ1 = λ2 = 0, and the only
possible solution is Dm = Σm2 .









Corollary 3.1. Let sm =− 1Σm be the value of s at the environment point m ∈ {1, ..., M} for
an agent i. Then, the amount of information at this point is equal to 0.5 bits.
Proof. From (3.6) we have sm =− 1Σm .








= 0.5 bits. (3.36)

The results in (3.35) and (3.36), show the limits for the distortion and the rate at which
the agent rationality is maximum. In other words, a decrease of the distortion below Dm2 ,
or an increase of the rate above 0.5 bits does not improve the agent understanding about
its environment. This is demonstrated in the next section.
3.1.3 The Rationality Effect
As we have mentioned, the highest rationality occurs when s=− 1Σ , whose equivalent
distortion is D= Σ2 . This can be observed in Figure 3.2, which shows a minimum for the
Kullback-Leibler value at this point, and a maximum in the borders. This effect is also
visualized in Figures 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5, which show in the left side, the trajectories followed
by a set of 10 agents moving through a variable spatial field, and the corresponding
comparison between the distributions p(x) and p(y|x) in the right side. In Figure 3.3a,
we observe the trajectories of the agents when s=−100Σ , i.e., a very low distortion value.
In this case, the similitude between the distributions p(x) and p(y|x) is low, as depicted
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in Figure 3.3b. On the other hand, Figures 3.3a and 3.3b show the behavior when s=− 1Σ ,
i.e., the highest rationality value. In this case, the trajectories of the agents are almost
the same as in the previous case, and the similitude between the probability distributions
is the highest. Finally, in Figures 3.5a and 3.5b, we show the case of s = − 1Σ , i.e., the
lowest rationality. Here, the agents follow trajectories that cover more locations within
the spatial field, making the system more exploratory. On the other hand, the similitude




















Figure 3.2: KL [p(x)||p(y|x)] for different distortion values.
3.1.4 Agent Redundancy Tracking
The agent understanding about the environment, given by the conditional p(y|x), allows
the agent to choose the action zi ∈ Zi to be performed depending on the desired kind of
exploration within the spatial field. In this sense, an agent selects the action having the
highest conditional probability when it expects to follow redundant environment cues.
On the other hand, an agent selects the action having the lowest conditional probability
if it wants to avoid redundant cues coming from the environment. This lead us to the
next pair of definitions.
Definition 3.4 (The less redundant environment location). For an agent i, with action
set Zi, the action exhibiting the lowest redundancy about the environment is given by
zm ∈ Zi : minp(y|x)= p(y|xm), for m ∈ {1, ..., M}. (3.37)
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(a) Trajectories of agents when s=− 100Σ .
xm


















p(xm) = N (7m;'m)
(b) The difference between p(x) and p(y|x) when s=
− 100Σ .
Figure 3.3: Multi-agent system behavior for a very low distortion value.
(a) Trajectories of agents when s=− 1Σ .
xm
















p(xm) = N (7m;'m)
(b) The difference between p(x) and p(y|x) when s=
− 1Σ .
Figure 3.4: Multi-agent system behavior for the highest rationality.
Definition 3.5 (The most redundant environment location). For an agent i, with action
set Zi, the action exhibiting the highest redundancy about the environment is given by
zm ∈ Zi : maxp(y|x)= p(y|xm), for m ∈ {1, ..., M}. (3.38)
In Figure 3.6, we show the trajectories of a set of agents when they follow redundant
and non redundant cues. Observe how in the case of Figure 3.6a, the agents tend to repel
each other, contributing to the environment exploration. On the other hand, in Figure
3.6b, we can notice how the agents tend to follow the trajectories of their neighborhood,
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(a) Trajectories of agents when s=− 12Σ .
xm
















p(xm) = N (7m;'m)
(b) The difference between p(x) and p(y|x) when s=
− 12Σ .
Figure 3.5: Multi-agent system behavior for the lowest rationality.
promoting the cluster formation. Notice how in this case, the isolated agents do not have
enough environment information, since their training data are reduced to their own
measurements.
(a) Trajectories of agents folowwing non redundant
cues.
(b) Trajectories of agents folowwing redundant cues.
Figure 3.6: Agent redundancy tracking.
The behavior exposed above, gains relevance in a system requiring that the agents
develop a repulsive or an attracting behavior, depending on the number of individuals
attending a specific event. This will be described in detail in Chapter 4, when the
proposed model is applied in a sensor coverage problem.
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So far, we have defined a multi-agent learning model in which agents have the ability
to decide between two specific behaviors established by the parameter s of the Blahut-
Arimoto algorithm. First, they can adopt a behavior conditioned by the lowest rationality
level, in which the environment exploration is promoted. Second, agents can understand
their environment without the necessity of a very low distortion or high information
levels as established in Theorem 3.2. Additionally, agents are able to define their actions
according to the level of redundancy in their environments.
In the next chapter, we include the game theory approach in our model, in order to
improve the agent performance, by means of a distributed optimization scheme that











INFORMATION THEORY LEARNING MODEL AND
EQUILIBRIUM CONVERGENCE
In this chapter, we include the potential games approach in order to define a schemefor the action selection used by the agents towards an equilibrium. First, we usethe expected distortion, provided by the rate distortion function, as a potential
function, whose minimization becomes the system objective. Second, the conditional
distribution obtained through the minimization of the mutual information, which, as we
stated in Chapter 3, describes the agent understanding about the environment, defines a
Logit dynamics pattern that the agents use to choose the actions offering the best utility
in an event tracking setting. Finally, the rationality levels also defined in Chapter 3,
which are determined by the parameter s of the Blahut-Arimoto algorithm, are used to
establish a convergence time towards a Nash equilibrium.
We show the performance of the final model in a mobile sensing setting, in which the
coverage problem is addressed. We first show the agent behavior in an invariant envi-
ronment, where the results resemble the consensus based potential function described
in [60]. Then, the model is implemented in a variant environment, and the distortion
minimization demonstrates to be dependent on the environment measurements and the
agent locations. Finally, our model exhibits a very good performance in a more realistic
setting, in which the trending network coverage problem is addressed with satisfactory
results in terms of convergence time, and number of agents, in comparison with the
results exposed in [60] and . However, in spite of the importance of this convergence time
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and the number of agents to reach the Nash equilibrium, the main result of this work, is
the ability of the agents to detect redundancy in their environment, an in this way, the
capacity to decide about the actions to assume. This, to the best of our known, has not
been addressed in literature.
4.1 The Logit Dynamics Pattern
As we shown in Chapter 2, one of the outputs of the Blahut-Arimoto algorithm is the
conditional distribution, which for a point m ∈ {1, ..., M}, i.e., a point belonging to the





which measures the agent understanding about the environment, under a distortion
value determined by s. Equation (4.1), can also be shown as a Boltzmann distribution,
in which s resembles the inverse temperature. This lead us to think on the conditional
distribution, as the expression used by the agents to choose their strategies, according to
a rationality measure given by the parameter s, whose limits were established through
Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 in Chapter 3.
Definition 4.1 (Logit dynamics pattern). The expression in (4.1) defines the strategy
updating rule for an agent i, according to the utility function
Ui = (y−µm)2, (4.2)
with y ∈Y1.
This means that an agent will choose the action having the highest similitude in
relation with the environment when it is developing a tracking event task. However,
there are some cases in which the number of agents attending a specific event, could
produce redundant measurements and unnecessary data transmission to sink points. In
this sense, the agents can revert the benefit described in (4.2), which lead them to refuse
dense locations and to explore new field positions, following the redundancy tracking
behavior exposed in Section 3.1.4. This will be demonstrated in the network coverage
problem described in Section 4.4.4. So far, we have defined the dynamics to be used
by the agents in order to make their action choice. In the next section, we define the
distortion based potential function that allows us to find an equilibrium.
1The alphabet Y represents a set of possible measurement values taken by the agent.
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4.2 Distortion Based Potential Game
As we shown in Chapter 2, the Nash equilibrium of a multi-agent system can be found if
the utility change of the each agent can be mapped through a potential function. In our
case, this potential function is based on the expected distortion established by the rate
distortion function. This is described by means of the next theorem.
Theorem 4.1. Let Z =∏N1 Zi be the set of strategy profiles for a potential game G having
N agents, in which the agent i ∈ {1, ..., N}, has the action set Zi = {z1, ..., zM}. The agent
utility function given in (4.2), constitutes an ordinal potential game whose potential








where µ(z) is the set of estimated mean values at the set of locations z = (z1, ..., zN) ∈ Z
constituting the system action profile.
Proof. According to (2.55), φ(z) is a potential function if
φ(z2, z−i)−φ(z1, z−i)> 0⇐⇒Ui(z2, z−i)−Ui(z1, z−i)> 0, (4.4)
where, z1, z2 ∈ Zi, and z−i is the set of actions assumed by the agents different to i. Then,
without loss of generality, from (2.22), and Theorem 3.2 we have that




The conditional probability p(y|x =µm) is inversely proportional to Σm, then
p(y|µ2)< p(y|µ1)=
p(y)es(y−µ2)






Since s ∈R<0, then (y−µ2)2 > (y−µ1)2, and
Ui(z2, z−i)−Ui(z1, z−i)> 0. (4.7)

With this in mind, the system objective is the minimization of the expected distortion.
At this point, we have defined all the aspects involved in the learning model pro-
posed in this work. In the next section, we summarize it and explain its computational
implementation.
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4.3 Information Theory Based Learning Model
Figure 4.1, summarizes the proposed multi-agent learning framework. Recalling the
multi-agent model described in Section 3.1, first we have the sets of training points S =
{s1, ..., sN }, and training values V = {v1, ...,vN }, coming, respectively, from the positions
and the measurements of the agents belonging to the neighborhood of the agent i,
which are used to infer, by means of GPR, the testing values W = {w1, ...,wM}, in a set of
previously known testing points Zi = {z1, ..., zM}. In this way, an agent i obtains a set of
mean and covariances for each point m ∈ {1, ..., M} of its action set, which define the set
of Gaussian distributions p(x) describing its environment. The rationality values, found
through Theorems 3.1 and 3.2, are used to define the desired amount of information that
the agents want to have about the environment, in order to promote the field exploration
when it is low, or to accelerate the equilibrium convergence of the system when it is
high. Once, the source distribution p(x) and the rationality value of s are defined, the
conditional probability p(y|x = µm) describing the similitude between the agent and a
point m ∈ {1, ..., M} of its environment2, is used as a Logit dynamics pattern, though
which the agent choose their actions. The selected action, can be oriented to follow high
or low redundancy, improving the event tracking in the first case, or the avoidance of
repetitive lectures due to the cluster formation in the second case, as we stated in Section
3.1.4. Finally, the distortion based potential function φ(z), allows the system to find a
Nash equilibrium at which the agents do not receive incentive to change their strategies
unilaterally.
2The set of points Zi = {z1, ...zm} corresponding to the action set of the agent i, is the same set of points
corresponding to its environment, as we stated in Chapter 3.
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p(x) = N (µ,Σ)
Rationality value:








∀ m ∈ {1, ..., M}.
Nash equilibrium
convergence:







Figure 4.1: The information theory based learning model.
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4.3.1 Computational Implementation
Algorithm 1 shows the computational implementation of our model. The Blahut-Arimoto
algorithm, described in Section 2.2.1, is included to obtain the conditional distribution
that defines the action selection rule of the agents. The set of covariance matrices, C∗,C,
and C∗∗, are obtained using the kernel function RBF, as defined in the GPR approach.
The selected action zi depends on the desired behavior of the agent, which can be to
follow redundancy or not. This behavior, will be applicable in the network coverage
problem described in Section 4.4.4, where the redundancy avoidance is used for the
agents to scape from positions covered by others. This algorithm calculates the action to
be selected by each agent, until the utility of each position belonging to the action set is
the same or almost the same, in such a way that there is no incentive to move,i.e., until
the Nash equilibrium condition is satisfied. In Section 4.4, we firstly show the model
Algorithm 1 REDUNDANCY BASED LEARNING
Input: S,V , Zi
Output: z∗i ∈ Zi
1: while Ui(zi, z∗−i)≤Ui(z∗i , z∗−i) do
2: M ← length(V )
µ← C∗C−1V
Σ← C∗∗−CT∗ C−1C∗
3: for m ← 1 to M do
4: p(x)←N (µm,Σm)





8: if Event tracking then
9: zi ← {zm : maxp(y|x)= p(y|xm)}, m ∈ {1, ..., M}
10: else if Environment redundancy then




performance in a variant and an invariant environment, in order to demonstrate the
effect of the measurements on the equilibrium convergence. Finally, we show how this




In this section, we show the results of the model implementation through a set of
simulations developed in a spatial 2-D field given by a 100×100 grid, in which, the
agents are deployed at random locations. The initial and final positions of the agents, are
represented by grey and black small circles, respectively. At each time step, an agent i,
selected at random, chooses its action from the action set Zi, according to (4.1), until the
potential function minimization is reached. First, by means of a simple example using
three agents, we demonstrate the effect of the parameter s on the learning rationality.
Second, we show how the agents behave in an invariable and in a variable setting to
demonstrate the effect of the environment change on the agent learning process. Finally,
we show a more realistic case in which a higher number of agents move in the spatial
field in order to fulfill a sensor coverage problem.
4.4.1 The Rationality Effect in Equilibrium Convergence
As we demonstrated in Theorem 3.2, there is a highest rationality value at which an agent
obtains the maximum information about the environment, and at which, a distortion
decrease does not improve the convergence time time to a Nash equilibrium. This is
shown in Figures 4.2a and 4.3a, in which we can observe, respectively, the trajectories
followed by the agents for s= −1Σ , and for s= −200Σ , i.e., the highest rationality value, and
a value of s corresponding to a very low distortion, equivalent to D = Σ400 . We can notice
that in addition to the similitude in the trajectories in both cases, the convergence time
is the same, in spite of the difference in the distortion levels, as shown in Figures 4.2b
and 4.3b. This proves that a decrease of the distortion value below the one settled by the
highest rationality, does not produce an improvement in the convergence time towards
the Nash equilibrium. On the other hand, in Figure 4.4a, we show the trajectories of the
agents when the parameter s is equal to −12Σ , i.e., the lowest rationality. In this case, we
can observe how the path of agent 1, initially deviates to locations far from its neighbors,
due to the increase in the distortion perceived about the environment, as shown in Figure
4.4b. Additionally, in this last case, the convergence time to the Nash equilibrium is
longer than the one obtained in the previous cases.
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(a) Trajectories of agents when s= −200Σ or D = Σ400 .
Simulation steps





















(b) The corresponding potential function minimiza-
tion.
Figure 4.2: The rationality effect when s= −200Σ .
(a) Trajectories of agents when s= −1Σ , i.e., the highest
rationality.
Simulation steps

























(b) The corresponding potential function minimiza-
tion.
Figure 4.3: The rationality effect when s= −1Σ .
4.4.2 Model Performance in an Invariable Environment
In Figure 4.5, we show the behavior of three agents moving in an invariant environment.
In this case, we assume that all the agents are connected, which means that the training
data set for each one is V = [v1, ...,v3]T , where v1 = v2 = v3, since the environment
is not variable. As a result, we can notice in Figure 4.5a, how the agents reach a
final arrangement in which the distortion based potential function is minimized in
approximately 45 simulation steps, as shown in Figure 4.5b. Additionally, we can observe
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(a) Trajectories of agents when s= −12Σ , i.e., the lowest
rationality.
Simulation steps

























(b) The corresponding potential function minimiza-
tion.
Figure 4.4: The rationality effect when s= −12Σ .
how the distortion for the three agents is almost the same during the whole simulation,
due to the uniform state of the environment.
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(a) Trajectories followed by the agents until the Nash
equilibrium.
Simulation steps





















(b) The potential function minimization.
Figure 4.5: Agent behavior in an invariable environment.
Due to the unchanging environment, the agent utility function
Ui = (y−C∗C−1V )2, (4.8)











with zm ∈ Zi, and sn ∈ S, i.e., the utility function, mostly depends on the distances
between the agents and the locations of the action set. This resembles the consensus based
utility function described in [60] [70], which only depends on the euclidean distances




||zi − z j||, (4.11)
where Ni is the neighborhood of the agent i. The potential function in this case, is
equated to the utility. Then φ(z)=Ui(z), where z ∈ Z, i.e., z is the current action profile
of the system. The action choice, in a spatial field with obstacles, follows a model named
restrictive spatial adaptive play (RSAP), where a trial action ẑi, is selected from the
highest of the two following probabilities, which determine if the agent has to move or to
stay in the current position, respectively.
Pr[ẑi = zi]= 1ki
, zi ∈ R(zi(t−1))\zi(t−1) (4.12)
Pr[ẑi = zi(t−1)]= 1− (|Ri(zi(t−1)|−1)ki
(4.13)
where Ri(zi(t−1)) is the set of restricted actions due to the obstacles, ki = maxzi∈Zi |Ri(zi)|
denotes the maximum number of possible actions if were not obstacles, and zi(t−1)
represents the current position. Once the trial action is selected, the agent action for the
next time step is chosen according to the probabilities









where β is the rationality measure, and
G = eβUi(ẑi,z−i(t−1))+ eβUi(zi(t−1)). (4.16)
Equations (4.14) and (4.15) define if the agent assumes the trial action or if it prefers
to keep its current location.
Coming back to our approach, in Figures 4.6a and 4.6b, we compare its performance
with the results of the model described above in an invariant environment having
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obstacles. As we can notice, in terms of simulation steps, the information theory based
model outperforms the results of the consensus based model shown in [60], since the
action choice in our case, is directly defined through the environment information,
established by the Logit pattern of (4.1), without the previous selection of a trial action.
Additionally, in our case, the rationality measure is constant and determines a highest
understanding about the environment, whereas in [60], this parameter is changed
arbitrarily until a good performance is found.
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(a) Concensus based model of [60]. Convergence after
1500 simulation steps.
x





















(b) Information theory based learning model.
Convergence after 240 simulation steps.
Figure 4.6: Comparison of our approach with the results shown in [60] in an invariant
field with obstacles.
4.4.3 Model Performance in a Variable Environment
The case of a variable environment is shown in Figure 4.7. Here, we can observe how the
measurement variations found in the environment of an agent i, affect the conditional
probability value p(y|x = µm) at each location zm ∈ Zi. In this sense, the final system
arrangement, shown in Figure 4.7a, not only depends on the distances between the
agents and their action sets, but also of the agents measurements and the inferred
values. In this case, in Figure 4.7b, we can observe at the beginning, how the distortion
value has a considerable difference for agent 2 in relation to the values of agents 1 and
3. This is a consequence of the measurements variation around them, since agents 1
and 3 have a similar setting, which is very different to the case of agent 2. Additionally,
due to the environment variability, the potential function requires more time steps to be
minimized in comparison with the case shown in Section 4.4.2.
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(a) Trajectories followed by the agents until the Nash
equilibrium.
Simulation steps





















(b) The potential function minimization.
Figure 4.7: Agent behavior in a variable environment.
4.4.4 Distributed Coverage Control
In Figure 4.8, we show the model performance in a field having 10 agents trying to cover
a specific area at which an event has occurred. In this setting, agents have different
sensing radius (rs), which are represented by colored circles surrounding them, whereas
each connection radius is defined as 2rs. As in [60], [19], and [123], in our model the
event detection is associated to a threshold level, which we have named thr. In this
regard, as we stated in Section 3.1.4, an agent i chooses the action having the lowest
conditional probability, i.e.,
zm ∈ Zi : min[p(y|x = thr)]= pm(y|x = thr), (4.17)
when its measurement is far from thr. In other words, the agent moves towards the
environment locations having the highest difference to its current measurement.
On the other hand, an agent i, chooses the action having the highest conditional
probability, i.e.,
zm ∈ Zi : max[p(y|x = thr)]= pm(y|x = thr), (4.18)
when its measurement is close to thr. This means that the agent moves towards the
environment locations having the lowest difference to its current measurement. In
this case, after a finite number of simulation steps, all the conditional probabilities
p(y|x = thr) of each action zm ∈ Zi, begin to exhibit similar values, which means that the
agent i does not have an action that improves its utility, whereas the other agents remain
static, in other words, they reach the Nash equilibrium. In Figure 4.8a, we can observe
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the initial positions and the trajectories followed by each agent until they reach the
locations around the environment event. Here, we can notice how some agents such as
the numbers 9 and 7 try to explore far from the profitable locations, and how they decide
to change their path towards more interesting positions reported by their neighbors. The
final configuration after 1000 time steps is shown in Figure 4.8b, and the behavior of
the distortion based potential function is shown in Figure 4.9. As we can observe, the
convergence to a minimum distortion in the system is obtained after 500 time steps, with
some slight increases after this point, which are caused by the repulsive movement of
agents in the borders, since they try to avoid locations covered by others.
The exhibited results outperform the results shown in [60] in terms of the number
of agents necessary to cover an event in a spatial field. This can be attributed to the
fact that in our model, each agent requires less time to decide about its next action,
since it does not require to make a previous calculation about a trial action, as stated
in the RSAP algorithm described in [60]. Additionally, in our case we have defined the
value at which the rationality measure (s) determines the highest understanding about
the environment, whereas in [60] this parameter is changed arbitrarily until a good
performance is found. Although we have shown the results in an environment having
only a covered region, the model is not limited to this type of settings, which means that
multiple events can be attended by the agents, leading the system to multiple local Nash
equilibrium. This is demonstrated through the results shown in Fig. 4.10. In Fig. 4.10a
we can observe the trajectories followed by the agents to attend two relevant locations,
whereas Fig. 4.10b shows how the distortion based potential function is minimized in less
time steps due to the change in the initial conditions and the increase of the rewarding
regions. The distortion increase exhibited at the beginning is produced by the initial
isolation of agents 3 and 4, which is reduced when they begin to find each other through
the communication link represented by the colored circles.
55
(a) The initial deployment of agents in the spatial
field and their trajectories towards the Nash equilib-
rium.
(b) The final network configuration.
Figure 4.8: Coverage problem.
Simulation steps



















Figure 4.9: The evolution of the potential function of the system.
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(a) The initial deployment of agents in the spatial field
and their trajectories towards the Nash equilibrium.
Simulation steps





















(b) Evolution of the potential function of the system.
Figure 4.10: Network coverage problem for two rewarding regions and change in the











CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
In this work, we use some of the advantages offered by the information theoryto define a multi-agent learning framework in which the information acquiresimportance in the agent decision making process. The model is based on three
approaches. The first one is the Gaussian process regression (GPR), through which
agents infer their environment. The second one is the rate distortion function (RDT),
which defines a redundancy border of the environment understanding for each agent. The
last one is the potential games approach, which, along with the established distortion
based potential function and the rationality levels given by the Lagrangian multiplier s,
allow the system to find a Nash equilibrium.
By means of the Blahut-Arimoto algorithm, used to calculate the RDF, we found two
relevant values that determine the lowest and the highest rationality measures, which,
as we demonstrated in a mobile sensor network, improve the agent understanding about
the environment and the field exploration, respectively. Additionally, the redundancy
based decision making, allows the agents to avoid overpopulated locations and migrate
to positions with promising welfare. This redundancy avoidance, has an important role
in the current sensing network design, especially in IoT applications, where the number
of monitoring devices increases continuously.
On the other hand, the Boltzmann form of the obtained conditional distribution,
which in our case represents the similitude between the agent and the environment
behavior, demonstrated to be an effective action selection rule for the agents in variant
and invariant spatial fields, even in cases involving obstacles, in which we outperform
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the consensus based potential game presented in [60] in terms of time steps.
From the distributed optimization point of view, the proposed distortion based poten-
tial function demonstrated a good performance in terms of the distortion minimization
of the environment information, and consequently the Nash equilibrium convergence
in an acceptable number of time steps, as we shown in the network coverage problem.
Additionally, due to the reduced number of probability calculations, in comparison with
the RSAP model initially proposed in [60], the action choice in our model does not require
a considerable number of agents to track and cover locations exhibiting relevant events
for the system.
Since this model is based on strategic games, in which agents choose their action
before the others choose theirs, the GPR inference tool provides an indirect connection
to the agents far from the agent neighborhood, since the actions taken by a neighbor of
one of its neighbors, are finally reflected in the training data set. This effect is visible in
the event tracking case of the coverage problem, in which some agents, in spite of being
outside of the connection radius of the ones located in wealth positions, move towards
these regions. In addition to this virtual neighborhood extension, the increment of the
training data points improves the environment prediction, and in this way, the quality of
the decisions. This is proven when the points inside of the sensing radius are used to
decrease the environment distortion, and therefore, the convergence time.
In spite of the fact that the model performance was described for mobile sensor
networks, its applicability was also demonstrated in the smart grids context, in which
the reactive power sharing problem was solved in an acceptable way, without considerable
affectations in the voltage regulation in a set of four DG’s when one of them suffers an
overload. Additionally, in this case we demonstrate the versatility of the model to involve
other types of game theory approaches in order to accomplish a distributed optimization
requirement, which was proven through the use of evolutionary game theory and the
replicator dynamics concept.
In general terms, the proposed model offers a learning structure in which the re-
dundant information of the environment is a determinant factor in the agent decision
making process, which is a relevant factor if we consider the continuous raising of mo-
bile sensor networks and their use in IoT applications, which generate high amounts
of redundant data. Additionally, due to the permanent node mobility, these types of
networks require distributed synchronization schemes, in which the nodes can decide
when and which one has to transmit data to the sink. In this sense, we are working in a













INFORMATION THEORY LEARNING MODEL FOR
REACTIVE POWER SHARING IN MICROGRIDS
In this chapter, we show a variation of the model described in Chapters 3 and 4,which is used in a power system application. The implementation combines theknown concepts of information theory such as the maximum entropy (MaxEnt), and
the rate distortion function (RDF), to control the reactive power sharing in an islanded
microgrid. In this case, the agents are representations of the distributed generators,
named DG’s, and the environment behavior is determined by the shared information
between them through a communications network. The distortion level of the information
that each agent has about the environment, determines a distortion based fitness function,
which is used in a replicator dynamics setting to control, in a distributed way, the power
support in the DG’s when they are overloaded.
A.1 Motivation
The massive rising of technological solutions focused to energy generation in isolated
locations, using renewable and environmentally friendly sources, has led to the imple-
mentation of distributed generators (DG) for electrical networks with low and medium
scope, designed to have a connection with the conventional power network, providing
significant benefits in the operation, such as power ancillary services for management
[18].
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The idea of the distributed generation, has been embraced by the concept of mi-
crogrids, which can be described as a resource to interconnect conventional voltage
transmission systems with the mentioned isolated distributed generators [52]. The ele-
ments comprising a microgrid, such as the storage devices, and loads, among others, can
be managed through a centralized control system, named the point of common coupling
(PCC), or through a distributed system with abilities to stabilize voltage and frequency
faults on each node, without the intervention of a centralized entity [58].
When a microgrid operates in this islanded mode, the main challenge is the sharing
of the reactive power demand between all the nodes (DG’s), in a way that has coherence
with the capacity of each one. The complexity of this objective is increased due to the
conflict between the voltage regulation and the reactive power sharing, caused by the
operating characteristics of the DG’s, since both variables have a dependency conditioned
by the drop control [96]. Such dependency, avoids to have a good performance in the
secondary control in terms of voltage regulation and reactive power simultaneously,
which has become in an interesting issue for the research community. In this sense, we
propose a multi-agent learning model, based on information theory that addresses the
problem of reactive power sharing, without affecting the voltage regulation considerably.
In a first step, the model calculates the maximum entropy (see Section 2.2.1.2) of every
reactive power input around an expected value that depends on the capacity in every DG.
Second, a fitness function is determined according to the value of the distortion of every
node with the environment, using the rate distortion function described in Section 2.2.
Finally, we use this fitness function in a replicator dynamics context, in order to identify
where and when some DG’s require reactive power support from the system.
In the next section, we describe the main technical concepts related to a microgrid.
A.2 Microgrid Control
In order to describe the control system of a microgrid, let us begin considering the
microgrid model shown in Figure A.1. This model is composed of a set of N = 6 buses, or
agents, in which two are loads, and four are DG’s. A reactance line connecting the pair of
buses i and j, is denoted as X i j. The active and the reactive power injections for a bus i,

































The heterogeneity of the generation in microgrids, includes systems such as photo-
voltaic, wind, and micro turbine, among others, which normally produce DC or variable
frequency power that require inverters to allow the DG’s connect to a synchronous AC
power system [97]. This connection process, demands control actions to achieve adequate
reactive power sharing between DG’s in order to avoid overcharges on them. In this
regard, there are three levels associated to the voltage control in microgids [96], which
we describe below.
A.2.1 Primary “Droop” Control
A main objective of a primary control is the microgrid stabilization by means of “droop”
controllers for the inverters [20], which causes voltage deviations in the buses of the
microgrid. In an islanded operation, the inverters operate as VSIs (Voltage Source
Inverters) with controlled voltage magnitudes. The “droop” controllers also provide the
voltage references, which are based on the decoupling between the active and reactive
power. For the inductive lines, these controllers specify the inverter voltage magnitudes
E i and frequency ωi, which are given by
E i = E∗−ni
(
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where E∗ is a nominal network voltage, Q i is the measured reactive (non-active) power
injection, ω∗ is the nominal network frequency, and Pi is the measured active power
injection. The constants ni and mi, are the “droop” coefficients. Finally, the quantities
Q i,set and Pi,set, represent the reactive and active power set points, respectively.
A.2.2 Secondary Control
In conventional interconnected electrical power systems, the sharing of reactive power
demand among generators, is not a relevant problem, due to the capacitive compensation
of the loads and the transmission lines. On the other hand, in microgrids, the low ratings
of DG units, the short electrical distances between nodes, and the lack of compensation,
require an accurate sharing of the reactive power demand among DG’s in order to avoid
overloading. In this sense, due to the impedance of the transmission lines, the primary
“droop” controller is unable to share reactive power among identical or different inverters
[58], which creates the necessity of a secondary controller that fulfills this purpose.
However, this reactive power sharing attempt, produces a conflict with the voltage
regulation, which can be observed in Figure A.2. First, without secondary control, two
DG’s operate at voltages E1 and E2 with their corresponding reactive power injections
Q1 and Q2, as represented by the black line. Once the secondary voltage-regulating
control is applied, the voltage in both DG’s is restored to a common rating denoted as
E∗, being the green line for the first DG, and the blue one for the second. In this case,





evidences the deterioration of the reactive power sharing, because in this case, these
values in both DG’s are more distant than before the secondary control application.
The accuracy of reactive power sharing depends on the upper and the lower limits of
the DG voltage magnitudes, and of the homogeneity of the transmission line reactances.
An ideal secondary voltage controller, should ensure a compromise between voltage regu-
lation and the reactive power sharing. In this sense, we propose a secondary controller
based on information theory approach, as we describe in Section A.3.
A.2.3 Tertiary Control
Since this kind of controller is out of the scope of this work, we only mention its main
purpose. The tertiary controller, is associated with a global economic dispatch. It is
possible to use different techniques to solve the economic dispatch problem in microgrids,
such as dynamic population games, as exposed in [72].
66
A.3. INFORMATION THEORY BASED MODEL FOR REACTIVE POWER SHARING
Figure A.2: E-Q “Droop” Controller.
A.3 Information Theory Based Model for Reactive
Power Sharing
In Figure A.3, we summarize the proposed multi-agent learning model. As we have
mentioned, it combines the rate distortion function, the maximum entropy principle, and
the replicator dynamics approach. The agent decision rule, is determined by a fitness
function that depends on its knowledge about the environment, which is calculated
through the distortion measure L(x, y) associated to the rate distortion function, where
the agent information is represented by y, and the environment information is repre-
sented by x. This means that a reduced distortion about the environment implies a good
fitness or utility for an agent.
For the microgrid case, the scheme depicted in Figure A.3 represents the modules
composing the DG controller. Let us describe it through the following steps:
1. Consider a microgird composed of N DG’s, supported by a communications network
to allow the information interchange. The neighborhood of a DG i, defined by the set
Ni = [DG1, ...,DGM], is composed of all the DG’s having a communication channel
towards DG i. The environment information of a DG i, which is obtained through
the intrinsic communications network, contains the reactive power data of Ni,
which we denote as Q = [Q1, ...QM].
2. The expected value 〈QDG〉, is determined by the reactive power at which each DG
normally should operate.
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ṙ i = r i( f i − f ),
with









Figure A.3: Information Theory Based Learning Model.
3. By means of the maximum entropy principle, described in Section 2.2.1.2, the














which describes the deviation of each DG in relation to the expected value 〈QDG〉.
4. The resulting probability p(QDG), is used as the source distribution in the Blahut-
Arimoto algorithm. At this point, we make p(x)= p(QDG), since we assume p(QDG)
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as the distribution describing the environment.
5. The Blahut-Arimoto algorithm, described in Section 2.2.1, is used to measure the






6. Finally, the similitude between the DG an its environment, define the fitness
function f i, and the replicator dynamics equation
ṙ i = r i( f i − f ), (A.7)
with




where r i is the proportion of the population assuming the strategy followed by
DG i, and ṙ i represents its variation in time.
A.4 Model Implementation
In this section, we describe the characteristics of the primary and the secondary con-
trollers, as well as the microgrid used to evaluate the effects of the proposed model on
the reactive power sharing.
A.4.1 Primary Control
Although the main interest of this approach is focused in the secondary controller, we
give a short description of the primary controller because of its influence. This is shown
in Figure A.4. In order to model the inverters, they are represented by controlled-voltage
sources, since in islanded operation, each inverter acts as a VSI (voltage source inverter),
to control the exported and the imported power to and from the conventional power
network to stabilize the microgrid [42]. The main idea behind the “droop” controllers is to
imitate the behavior of a synchronous machine, which in this case, reduces the frequency
when the active power load increases, and reduces the voltage magnitude, when the
reactive power increases.
1As stated in Section 2.1, x and y belong to the alphabets X and Y , respectively, which in the case of
the microgrid, correspond to a set of possible values for the reactive power.
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Figure A.4: Primary Control.
A.4.2 Secondary Controller
The secondary controller is used to compensate the deviations for frequency and voltage
magnitude, ensuring that they tend to zero after a change in load or generation in the
microgrid. A detailed diagram of the implemented secondary control for voltage, in the
case of a single DG, is depicted in Figure A.5. It is important to mention that although
the primary frequency control of each DG must be considered to obtain the reference










The microgrid used to simulate the behavior of the proposed information theory based
controller, is shown in Figure A.1, which is composed of four inverters, three intercon-
nection lines and two loads. The lines are modeled as RL branches connected in series,
the loads are connected to units 1 and 4, and are modeled as constant power devices. In
Table A.1, we provide the most relevant parameters. Additional information is reported
in [96].
Table A.1: Microgrid Parameters
Parameter Value
Nominal frequency 50 Hz
DC Voltage 650 V
AC Voltage 325.3 V
Filter capacitance 25 µF
Filter inductance 1.8 mH
Output inductance 1.8 mH
Line Impedance Z12 0.8+ j1.131 Ω
Line Impedance Z23 0.4+ j0.565 Ω




The simulation results show the voltage and reactive power behavior on each DG when
the load is abruptly duplicated in the DG1 during the time interval from t=1s to t=2.5s.
In Figure A.6, we show the effect of the proposed controller on the reactive power sharing.
In Figure A.6a, we show how the information theory based controller reduces the reactive
power in the DG1, which is distributed to the others. On the other hand, in Figure A.6b,
we show that the reactive power is poorly shared.
In contrast, a comparison between Figures A.7a and A.7b, illustrates a non-significant
difference between the voltage magnitudes before and after applying the proposed
secondary control when the load increase occurs, which means that there is not a
considerable voltage variation.
Finally, in Table A.2, we show the relationship between the maximum reactive power
values when the MaxEnt principle is included or not in the proposed controller. In the
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(a) Reactive power sharing using secondary control.
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(b) Reactive power sharing without secondary control.
Figure A.6: The effect of the secondary controller on the reactive power sharing.
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(a) Voltage response using secondary control.
time (s)
























(b) Voltage response without secondary control.
Figure A.7: The effect of the secondary controller on the voltage.
first case, when the MaxEnt module is included, the maximum reactive power peak,
reached when the load increases in the DG1, is higher in relation to the value obtained
when this module is ignored, i.e., the RDF stage assumes p(x) as a uniform distribution.
This result demonstrates that in addition to the distortion reduction between the DG
behavior and its environment, provided by the RDF, there is an extra reduction in
uncertainty produced by the MaxEnt principle, which is demonstrated in Figure A.8.
Notice how the MaxEnt module produces and extra reduction in the distortion value
when the DG1 is overloaded, which impacts favorably in the reactive power sharing.
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Table A.2: Maximum DG1 peaks and times in overload event
Maximum Q (VAr) time (s)
Without controller 1025 1.1629
Using MaxEnt 779 1.1629
Without MaxEnt 794 1.1652
time (s)
















Figure A.8: Distortion when MaxEnt is included or not in the controller.
A.6 Conclusions
We implemented a secondary voltage controller based on information theory concepts
such as the rate distortion function and the maximum entropy in order to define a
distortion based fitness function. The distributed control is implemented by means of
the replicator dynamics approach, which uses the previously calculated fitness function
to define the strategy selection of each distributed generator (DG) of a microgrid. The
implemented controller improves considerably the power sharing condition between all
of the DG’s operating in an islanded mode, specially when an abrupt load increase is
applied to the system.
When the MaxEnt module is included in the controller, the distortion is reduced and
consequently the reactive power peaks decrease when abrupt changes in load are present
in any of the DG’s.
On the other hand, in terms of the voltage magnitudes, in spite of the fact that they
are not directly controlled, there is not a considerable degradation in their behavior
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when the information theory based controller is used to obtain a reactive power shar-
ing. It demonstrates that it is possible to use the proposed control technique without











KULLBACK-LEIBLER DIVERGENCE OF TWO GAUSSIAN
DISTRIBUTIONS
As we described in Section 2.1, the Kullback-Leibler divergence, also knownas the relative entropy, is a measure of the distance between two probabilitydistributions. It is commonly used to find the gain or loss of information obtained
for describing with a distribution Q a random variable X whose original distribution is




which is always non-negative and equal to zero if and only if P =Q.
B.1 Kullback-Leibler Divergence of Two Gaussian
Distributions



































































































































STEPS TO MINIMIZE THE MUTUAL INFORMATION







































J [p(y|x), p(y)] . (C.3)
The above double minimization problem, is solved through the next two steps:




sD−λ+ J [p(y|x), p(y)]
]
= p(x) log p(y|x)+ p(x)− p(x) log p(y)
− sp(x)L(x, y)+λ= 0.
(C.4)
77
APPENDIX C. STEPS TO MINIMIZE THE MUTUAL INFORMATION











i.e., λ is selected to accomplish the condition
∑
y p(y|x)= 1. Therefore, the initially






2. For fixed p(y|x): In this case, it is enough to prove that
I(X ;Y )=min
p(y)



























x p(x)p(y|x) = p∗(y) and using the Kullback-Leibler divergence (see ap-





= KL(p∗||p)= 0, (C.13)
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which means that the equality is satisfied if and only if the probability distributions
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